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Note
STEERING A SAFE COURSE IN ADMIRALTY REMOVAL
JURISDICTION AFTER THE 2011 FEDERAL COURTS
JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT
CHARLES MODZELEWSKI

Federal jurisdiction over admiralty actions originates in the
United States Constitution. Congress, in the admiralty jurisdiction
statute, pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the saving to
suitors clause, reserved to plaintiffs in admiralty actions the option
of pursuing remedies in state court. However, in 2011, Congress
enacted the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act
(JVCA), which changed key language in the federal removal statute.
The JVCA amendment has been interpreted by certain courts in a
manner that has allowed removal of general maritime actions from
state court to federal court, which is contrary to admiralty
jurisprudence. Not only is the removal of general maritime actions
contrary to precedent, but the removal of general maritime claims to
federal courts would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause, an
action that would fundamentally alter admiralty jurisdiction. As the
saving to suitors clause would be eviscerated, interpreting the 2011
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act to allow the
removal of general maritime actions from state court to federal
court is erroneous.
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STEERING A SAFE COURSE IN ADMIRALTY REMOVAL
JURISDICTION AFTER THE 2011 FEDERAL COURTS
JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT
CHARLES MODZELEWSKI
“Maritime law is not a monistic system. The State and
Federal Governments jointly exert regulatory powers today
as they have played joint roles in the development of
maritime law throughout our history.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation is preferably avoided, but when litigation becomes
inevitable, jurisdiction is one of the first and most important considerations
when filing a lawsuit. Choosing between a state and federal forum has
important ramifications for all parties involved, whether one is the plaintiff
or the defendant. In certain circumstances the defendant may even play a
role in choosing the litigation forum, through removing an action filed in
state court to federal court. If jurisdictional law is unsettled or unclear,
plaintiffs and defendants alike will be confused as to which fora are
available, and whether they will be able to bring suit in the forum of their
choice. A situation such as this can increase the cost of a lawsuit, by
requiring motions and pleadings to simply establish the court in which the
lawsuit will occur, while also decreasing judicial efficiency by requiring
courts to attempt to clarify the jurisdictional law. Admiralty jurisdiction is
currently facing such a situation due to the recent amendment to the federal
removal statute. While jurisdiction is important in all lawsuits, jurisdiction
is critically important in admiralty2 actions because it is determinative of
special rights, remedies, and procedures available to the parties involved.
This Note aims to navigate through the confusion regarding the recent
amendment to the removal statute, and demonstrate how only one
interpretation of the federal removal statute is correct.

University of Connecticut, B.A. 2013, University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate
2016. I would like to thank the editors of the Connecticut Law Review for all their effort and hard work
in editing my Note. I would also like to thank Professor Robert Birmingham for suggesting this Note
topic to me and for offering his advice. Additionally, I would like to thank my family for supporting me
in all my endeavors.
1
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 374 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.).
2
For the purposes of this Note, I will use the term “admiralty” to refer to admiralty and maritime
claims broadly unless specifically noted.

1156

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1153

The United States Constitution provides that the federal courts will
have jurisdiction over admiralty actions.3 Congress has enlarged this
original grant of constitutional power by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1333.4
Pursuant to the current language of this statute, Congress granted original
jurisdiction to federal district courts of “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to
which they are otherwise entitled.”5 The second half of this grant of power
is commonly referred to as the saving to suitors clause or the savings
clause.6
The saving to suitors clause saves to a plaintiff whatever non-admiralty
remedies he has available.7 The clause does not save a state remedy or a
remedy in a state court, but saves to the plaintiff any common law remedy.8
When a plaintiff seeks monetary damages in tort or contract actions that
fall within admiralty, he usually has the choice of bringing suit in
admiralty in federal court or bringing suit in state court.9 Thus, in practice,
the saving to suitors clause allows a plaintiff certain control in determining
in which forum to bring his suit.
When a plaintiff brings a civil action in state court, the action may be
removed to federal court by the defendant if specific statutory criteria are
satisfied.10 However, in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,11
the Supreme Court recognized an important exception to the removal of
general maritime claims.12 In Romero, the Court noted that when a suit is
commenced in state court, and it could have been brought in federal court
on the basis of jurisdiction pursuant only to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the action
may not be removed as it would undermine the purpose of the saving to

3

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (granting admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction of “[a]ny
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction”).
5
Id. (emphasis added).
6
See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 21 (2d ed. 1975)
(“Consideration of the so-called ‘savings clause’ . . . must be deferred until a little later along . . . .”);
see also ROBERT FORCE, FED. JUD. CTR., ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW 19 (2nd ed. 2013) (“Section
1333 of title 28 not only confers admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts, it also contains a provision
characterized as the ‘saving to suitors’ clause.”).
7
GILMORE & BLACK, JR., supra note 6, at 37 (“[A] suitor who holds an in personam claim, which
might be enforced by suit in personam in admiralty, may also bring suit, at his election, in the
‘common law’ court—that is, by ordinary civil action in state court . . . .”); ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN
NORRIS, LAW OF SEAMAN § 1.7 (5th ed. 2014).
8
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866); FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.8.
9
FORCE, supra note 6, at 19.
10
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing the statutory criteria for the removal of actions).
11
358 U.S. 354 (1959).
12
See id. at 363, 370–73 (noting that general maritime claims are not removable solely on the
basis of admiralty jurisdiction); FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11 (describing the Romero
decision and the removability of general maritime claims).
4
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13

suitors clause. Romero does not preclude the removal of all admiralty
actions; it only precludes the removal of actions that are based solely on 28
U.S.C. § 1333.14 Therefore, admiralty actions may be removed only when
there is an independent basis for removal, such as when diversity of
citizenship is present.15
However, in 2011, Congress passed the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and
Venue Clarification Act (JVCA), which became effective in 2012.16 The
JVCA, inter alia, changed the language of the federal removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441.17 The change of pertinent statutory language has led some
courts and commentators to interpret the JVCA as relaxing the restriction
on the removal of general maritime claims from state to federal court.18
However, such an interpretation abrogates the saving to suitors clause by
allowing a defendant to remove claims that have been properly brought by
a plaintiff seeking common law remedies in state court. Thus, as this
interpretation of the JVCA would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause
and allow the removal of general maritime claims to federal court, this
interpretation is erroneous.
This Note will proceed in five parts. Part II will describe admiralty
jurisdiction before the 2011 JVCA amendment. Part III will detail the
JVCA amendment. Part IV will highlight the differing interpretations of
the JVCA amendment. Part V will identify how courts should apply the
JVCA amendment.

13

Romero, 358 U.S. at 371–72; FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11.
Romero, 358 U.S. at 363, 370–73; FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11.
15
See FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11 (“Romero does not preclude removal of a maritime
case where there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity . . . .” (quoting
Camacho v. Cove Trader, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1190, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1985))); GILMORE & BLACK, JR.,
supra note 6, at 38 (citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 375) (“It has been decided by the Supreme Court that he
may not sue in federal court, absent diversity, on the theory that a maritime claim ‘arises under’ the
laws of the United States.”); Rory Bahadur, Maritime Removal: An Unlikely Heuristic for Anchoring
Three Non-Textual Principles of Original Federal Jurisdiction, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 195, 208 (2012)
(“The result of this pronouncement is that general maritime law claims may not be removed from state
court unless there is an independent basis of jurisdiction present other than admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).
16
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat.
758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see David W. Robertson & Michael F.
Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 401, 407 (2013) (noting that the law was signed in December
2011 and took effect on January 6, 2012).
17
Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 407.
18
See, e.g., id. (noting that the JVCA amendment appears to have “eased” the removability of
general maritime actions); see also Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D.
Tex. 2013) (holding that the 2011 amendment to the removal statute now allows for the removal of
general maritime claims).
14
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II. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND REMOVAL PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL
COURTS JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2011
Federal jurisdiction over admiralty claims originates in the United
States Constitution, which grants federal courts jurisdiction over “all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”19 Congress, in the Judiciary Act of
1789, conferred this constitutional grant of power onto the federal
judiciary, which provided lower federal courts with both diversity and
maritime jurisdiction.20 The saving to suitors clause was included in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and qualified this grant of jurisdictional power by
“saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it.”21 Congress codified the admiralty
jurisdiction grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1333,22 and while Congress has since
changed the language of the saving to suitors clause, the substance of the
clause has remained essentially unchanged since its enactment.23 In its
current language, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides that federal district courts
shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of state courts of “[a]ny civil case
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”24 Hence, federal courts are
granted original jurisdiction over admiralty actions, with the exception of
the saving to suitors clause, which saves to a plaintiff in admiralty actions
any common law remedies available to him. However, in admiralty
actions, the difference between in rem jurisdiction and in personam
jurisdiction is critical to the correct application of jurisdictional power.
That is because in admiralty the difference is determinative of certain
rights and procedures in regard to the saving to suitors clause.25 The saving
to suitors clause saves to a plaintiff the option of pursuing common law
remedies in state court.26 Thus, it appears that there is a conflict within 28
19

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755–56 (E.D. La. 2014)
(discussing the foundation of admiralty jurisdiction); Kenneth G. Engerrand, Admiralty Jury Trials
Reconsidered, 12 LOY. MAR. L.J. 73, 74–75 (2013) (discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
admiralty jurisdiction); see also Ventura Packers, Inc. v. F/V Jeanine Kathleen, 305 F.3d 913, 918 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . conferred upon the federal district courts exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases arising from seizures made on navigable waters . . . .”).
21
Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 755..
22
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
23
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443–44 (2001) (“In the intervening years,
Congress has revised the language of the saving to suitors clause, but its substance has remained largely
unchanged.”); Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (quoting Lewis, 531 U.S. at 444). .
24
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
25
Engerrand, supra note 20, at 85.
26
Lewis, 531 U.S. at 454–55 (“Tracing the development of the [saving to suitors] clause since the
Judiciary Act of 1789, it appears that the clause was designed to protect remedies available at common
law. We later explained that the clause extends to ‘all means other than proceedings in admiralty which
may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved.’ Trial by jury is an obvious, but
not exclusive, example of the remedies available to suitors.” (internal citations omitted)).
20
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U.S.C. § 1333, which provides original jurisdiction to federal courts,
exclusive of state courts, in matters of admiralty jurisdiction.27 However,
the conflict is illusory because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
only over in rem proceedings.28
In Madruga v. Superior Court,29 the Supreme Court highlighted the
difference between proceedings in rem and in personam.30 In Madruga,
eight individuals who owned eighty-five percent of a vessel brought suit in
California state court against the owner of the remaining fifteen percent of
the vessel, seeking to have it sold and partitioned pursuant to a California
statute.31 In distinguishing between in personam and in rem actions, the
Court stated that “[a]dmiralty’s jurisdiction is ‘exclusive’ only as to those
maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem, that
is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the
defendant by name or description to enforce a lien.”32 Further, the Court
noted that state courts may adjudicate cases in personam, stating that “the
jurisdictional act does leave state courts ‘competent’ to adjudicate
maritime causes of action in proceedings ‘in personam,’ that is, where the
defendant is a person, not a ship or some other instrument of navigation.”33
The Court in Madruga held that the partition action was not an in rem
action because the plaintiffs’ claims were against their co-owner and not
the ship, which rendered California common law competent to provide the
partition remedy.34 Federal courts retain exclusive original jurisdiction over
admiralty in rem actions, but state courts—pursuant to the saving to suitors
clause—may exercise jurisdiction over in personam proceedings.35
Therefore, the saving to suitors clause provides plaintiffs three different
alternatives:
Since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, maritime
suitors have had the option of bringing maritime claims
27

28 U.S.C. § 1333.
Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 756; Engerrand, supra note 20, at 78.
29
346 U.S. 556 (1954).
30
Id. at 560; see Engerrand, supra note 20, at 83–84 (discussing Madruga and the distinction
between in personam and in rem actions in admiralty jurisdiction).
31
Madruga, 346 U.S. at 557.
32
Id. at 560.
33
Id. at 560–61.
34
Id. at 561.
35
See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 448, 452–55 (2001) (discussing the
tension between the saving to suitors clause and Limitation Act proceedings, which have exclusive
federal jurisdiction). The Court found an exception to the exclusive federal jurisdiction of Limitation
Act proceedings, stating, “[i]n sum, this Court’s case law makes clear that state courts, with all their
remedies, may adjudicate claims like petitioner’s against vessel owners so long as the vessel owner’s
right to seek limitation of liability is protected.”. Id. at 455; see also Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.),
Inc., No. 08-4007, 2014 WL 4794758, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2014) (discussing the implication of the
limitation of liability actions and admiralty jurisdiction).
28
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(seeking remedies the common law is competent to give) in
federal court under admiralty jurisdiction, in state court, or in
federal court under an independent ground of jurisdiction
such as diversity of citizenship.36
The concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts is important
because depending on where the plaintiff initially files suit, different
procedures and remedies are available to the plaintiff.37
While the saving to suitors clause preserves the concurrent jurisdiction
of federal and state courts and allows a plaintiff to bring suit in either
forum, the substantive law that is applied in the different fora is the same
because substantive maritime law is applied regardless of where the suit is
initially filed.38 When discussing the law applicable in saving to suitors
clause cases brought in state court, Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr.
state that “[t]he general answer might seem clear: The same substantive
law ought to be applied as would have been applied had the suit been
brought in admiralty. Specifically, the general maritime law, where
applicable, ought to rule, even though suit is brought in state court.”39 The
United States Supreme Court in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger40 stated
that “[t]he general rules of the maritime law apply whether the proceeding
be instituted in an admiralty or common-law court.”41 Consequently, when
a suit is brought in state court, the reverse-Erie doctrine applies.42 The
reverse-Erie doctrine requires state substantive remedies to conform to

36

Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citation omitted).
See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 446 (“Admiralty and maritime law includes a host of special rights,
duties, rules, and procedures.”).
38
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738–41 (1961); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger,
259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922); In re Amtrack “Sunset Ltd.” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 1424–26 (11th Cir.
1997); Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756–57 (E.D. La. 2014) (quoting
Carlisle Packing Co., 259 U.S. at 259); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1182; see GILMORE & BLACK, JR.,
supra note 6, at 45–47 (discussing substantive maritime law and its components); W. Cameron Beard,
III, Comment, General Agency Agreements and Admiralty Jurisdiction, 17 CONN. L. REV. 595, 627
(1985) (“To do so undermines the uniform application of the rules governing the shipping industry and
maritime commerce—the very purpose for which admiralty jurisdiction was originally vested in the
federal courts.” (emphasis added)), cited in Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, 500 U.S. 603, 610
(1991). But see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202 (1996) (“We hold, in
accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that state remedies remain
applicable in such cases and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death
action . . . .”).
39
GILMORE & BLACK, JR., supra note 6, at 50–51.
40
Carlisle Packing Co., 259 U.S. at 259.
41
Id. (citing Chelentis v. Lukenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 381 (1918)).
42
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222–23 (1986) (“[T]he ‘saving to suitors’
clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, but in such cases the
extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called
‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to
governing federal maritime standards.” (citations omitted)).
37
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governing federal maritime standards. “Thus, where the subject-matter
falls within the admiralty jurisdiction, state law may ‘supplement’ federal
law but may not directly contradict it.”44 Whichever forum a plaintiff
chooses, the substantive law that is applied is general maritime law, unless
the plaintiff is pursuing his claim under a statutory basis.45 While the
substantive law in the different fora may be the same, the procedures that
are applied differ dramatically in certain circumstances.46
A plaintiff’s decision of whether to bring his cause of action in federal
court in admiralty or in state court has important ramifications for the
procedures that are applied by the respective court. Admiralty law includes
special rights, duties, and procedures, some of which are exclusive to
admiralty, while other rights and procedures are available in suits at law.47
One of the most important distinctions for a plaintiff in admiralty actions is
that there is generally no right to a jury trial48 because the Seventh
Amendment does not include admiralty actions.49 Thus, if a plaintiff wants
to exercise his right to a jury trial, he must bring his case pursuant to the
common law remedies that are saved to him by the saving to suitors
clause.50 This is indicative of the importance of the saving to suitors clause.
If a plaintiff wishes to have his cause of action heard by a jury, he must
bring his claim pursuant to the saving to suitors clause because an action
brought in admiralty will not afford him the right to a jury trial.51
In the seminal case of Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co.,52 a decision written by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of the saving to suitors clause in providing a
43

Id.
Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 825 F. Supp. 424, 427 (D. Mass. 1993) (citations omitted). See
GILMORE & BLACK, JR., supra note 6, at 49–50 (“All that can be said in general is that the states may
not flatly contradict established maritime law, but may ‘supplement’ it . . . .”).
45
See GILMORE & BLACK, JR., supra note 6, at 45–47 (discussing substantive maritime law, its
components, and the influence of statutes on substantive maritime law).
46
See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 446 (2001) (describing the different
rights, remedies, and procedures available in admiralty law).
47
See id. (“Admiralty and maritime law includes a host of special rights, duties, rules, and
procedures.”); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (noting that
admiralty law includes special rights and procedures).
48
See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“While this Court has held that the
Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any
other provision of the Constitution forbids them.”); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183 (discussing how one
of the major distinctions between admiralty claims and claims brought at law is the right to a jury trial).
49
Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183.
50
See Engerrand, supra note 20, at 78 (discussing the saving to suitors clause and the remedies
saved to plaintiffs).
51
See Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20 (“While this Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does
not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the
Constitution forbids them.”); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183 (discussing how one of the major
distinctions between admiralty claims and claims brought at law is the right to a jury trial).
52
358 U.S. 354 (1959).
44
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53

plaintiff common law remedies. In Romero, the plaintiff was a Spanish
sailor who was seriously injured by a cable while working on a Spanishflagged vessel in New York waters.54 Romero alleged various causes of
action including a Jones Act claim55 and general maritime claims such as
unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and a maritime tort.56 The plaintiff
brought his causes of action on the law side of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting jurisdiction
pursuant to the Jones Act and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.57 The District
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the Jones
Act did not provide a right of action in the circumstances presented.
Further, the court also dismissed the general maritime claims due to a lack
of diversity of citizenship and because 28 U.S.C. § 1331 did not confer
jurisdiction over claims of federal admiralty law.58 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.59
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case after an extensive
analysis of the jurisdictional boundaries of admiralty law.60 The Court
began its analysis with the origins of admiralty jurisdiction in the United
States Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789,61 noting that the
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 were the initial grants of
admiralty jurisdiction to the lower federal courts.62 The Court held that the
Judiciary Act of 1875—which extended jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts to “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority”63—did not include admiralty
cases because the language and construction of the statute rejected the

53

Id. at 371–73.
Id. at 355–56.
55
The Jones Act is referenced frequently throughout this Note and therefore a brief explanation is
required. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001) (“A Jones Act claim is an
in personam action for a seaman who suffers injury in the course of employment due to negligence of
his employer, the vessel owner, or its crew members.”); Matthew Ammerman, The New Removal
Regime, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 389, 397 (2014) (“Jones Act claims are nonremovable pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1445(a). However, a fraudulently pleaded Jones Act claim does not bar removal.”); but see
infra notes 191–96 and accompanying text (discussing how Ammerman’s conclusion regarding the
JVCA is erroneous).
56
Romero, 358 U.S. at 356.
57
Id. at 357; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (providing the statutory criteria for federal question
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (providing the statutory criteria for diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction).
58
Romero, 358 U.S. at 357–58.
59
Id. at 358.
60
Id. at 385.
61
Id. at 360–61.
62
Id. at 360.
63
Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
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inclusion of admiralty into the Act.
Moreover, the Court noted that the inclusion of general maritime
jurisdiction would be contrary to the construction of the Judiciary Act of
1875, and that such an interpretation would have a negative impact on the
traditional allocation of power of admiralty in the federal system,
especially in regard to the saving to suitors clause.65 An expansion of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 to include general maritime jurisdiction would annihilate the
maritime plaintiff’s traditional option of choosing his forum, either state or
federal, contrary to the saving to suitors clause.66 A maritime plaintiff’s
option to choose his forum would be destroyed because his action would
be freely removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which allows for the
removal of any civil action over which the district courts have original
jurisdiction arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.67
The Court, in part, rejected such an interpretation because “making
maritime cases removable to the federal courts . . . would make
considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction
of the state courts in admiralty matters—a jurisdiction which it was the
unquestioned aim of the savings clause of 1789 to preserve.”68 Thus,
Romero stands for the proposition that admiralty cases are not considered
federal questions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,69 and that the saving to
suitors clause is an important part of admiralty jurisdiction that does not
allow the removal of general maritime actions to federal court unless there
is an independent basis for removal.70
Therefore, the precedent of Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., in addition to the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. §
1333, prevents the removal of general maritime claims properly brought in
state court. However, Congress, with the enactment of the Federal Courts
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, has created confusion as
to whether general maritime claims are now removable pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441.71

64

Id. at 368.
Id. at 371–72.
66
Id.
67
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); Romero, 358 U.S. at 371–72.
68
Romero, 358 U.S. at 372.
69
Id. at 378.
70
FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11.
71
Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 407 (stating that the JVCA amendment has made some
“potentially troublesome changes” to the removal statute).
65
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III. THE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION
AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2011
The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act (JVCA)
was enacted in 2011.72 The JVCA changed pertinent language in the
federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441.73 The change in language has
led courts to misconstrue the recent amendment to the removal statute to
allow the removal of general maritime claims to federal court.74 This
interpretation is contrary to the precedent established by the Supreme
Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. and to the saving
to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.75
There are generally four ways for a defendant to remove a lawsuit from
state to federal court.76 This includes invoking a federal question, diversity
of the parties, a statute that specifically permits removal, and alienage
jurisdiction.77 Additionally, as federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, removal statutes are construed in favor of remand and against
removal.78 Thus, the holding of Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co. is that general maritime claims do not constitute a federal
question and therefore there needs to be another independent basis for
removal, such as diversity jurisdiction.79 Further, remand orders are
generally not appealable, which may require a litigant to proceed in a
forum that they did not choose if a judge issues a remand order that is not
in their favor.80 Therefore, the interpretation of the JVCA amendment to
72
Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C. (2012)).
73
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (providing the statutory criteria for removal prior to the
JVCA), with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing the amended language of the removal statute
following the enactment of the JVCA).
74
Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 407.
75
See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (providing the saving to suitors clause); Romero v. Int’l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378–80 (1959) (noting that general maritime claims are not removable
without an independent basis for removal).
76
Ammerman, supra note 55, at 390–91.
77
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (allowing for the removal of any civil action over which the
federal district courts have original jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012) (allowing for the removal
of actions based on diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012) (providing for the removal of
any action brought against the United States or United States agency and any officer of such agency);
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2012) (stating that federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions
between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign State, thus allowing for removal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441).
78
See Romero, 358 U.S. at 379–80 (discussing the reluctance of the Supreme Court to expand
federal jurisdiction); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (stating that
courts must strictly construe the removal statute against removal and that statutes extending federal
jurisdiction are to be narrowly construed).
79
Romero, 358 U.S. at 378–80; see FORCE & NORRIS, supra note 7, § 1.11 (discussing Romero
and the removability of admiralty actions).
80
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012) (stating that remand orders are not appealable unless there is a
statutory exception such as 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012)).
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the removal statute is of critical importance to the removal of general
maritime claims.
Prior to the JVCA amendment in 2011, the relevant portion of 28
U.S.C. § 1441 provided that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed.”81 The JVCA amendment did not change the relevant portion of
subsection (a) of the removal statute.82 The controversy arises in the
JVCA’s amendment to subsection (b) of the statute. Prior to 2011, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) provided:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of
the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.83
The JVCA amendment to the removal statute in 2011 deleted key
language from subsection (b). This subsection now provides that “[a] civil
action otherwise removable solely on the basis of jurisdiction under section
1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.”84
While the JVCA was intended to clarify the law, the removal of the
second sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) has caused confusion in the lower
courts. Some courts have interpreted the amendment to the removal statute
to allow the removal of general maritime claims to federal court.85
However, this interpretation misconstrues the precedent established in
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. and by the saving to
suitors clause. Interpreting the JVCA amendment to the removal statute to
allow the removal of general maritime claims would render the saving to
suitors clause useless, by permitting a defendant to remove actions that
81

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime
Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 419, 477 (2014).
83
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
84
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012).
85
E.g., Ryan v. Hercules Offshore Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013); see
Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1179 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (discussing different courts
interpretations of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute); Ammerman, supra note 55, at 390–91
(discussing the implications of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute and the differing
interpretations).
82
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were properly brought by a plaintiff pursuing common law remedies in
state court. Therefore, as this interpretation is contrary to the precedent
established in Romero—which precludes the removal of general maritime
claims without an independent basis of federal jurisdiction aside from 28
U.S.C. § 1333—and as it would make the saving to suitors clause
irrelevant, this interpretation is erroneous.86
IV. CASES INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION AND
VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2011 AND THE SAVING TO SUITORS
CLAUSE
The lower federal courts have interpreted the JVCA amendment to the
removal statute in two primary ways. One interpretation of the JVCA
amendment is that the jurisdictional boundaries of admiralty law have not
been substantively changed and that the removal of general maritime
claims is not permissible solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction.87
This interpretation of the JVCA amendment is consistent with established
precedent and the purpose of the saving to suitors clause.88 The other
interpretation of the JVCA amendment is that the deletion of the pertinent
language in the removal statute now permits the removal of general
maritime claims.89 The leading case for the new interpretation of the
removability of general maritime claims is Ryan v. Hercules Offshore,
Inc.,90 and the court’s interpretation in that case will be referred to as the
“Ryan interpretation” throughout the remainder of this Note.
A.

A Number of Courts Have Interpreted the JVCA Amendment as
Allowing the Removal of General Maritime Claims

In Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., the estate of the decedent brought
an action that asserted negligence and unseaworthiness claims pursuant to
the Death on the High Seas Act and general maritime law.91 The decedent
was working for the defendant, Wild Well Control, Inc., on a Jack-Up
86

Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378–80 (1959).
See, e.g., Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La.
Nov. 7, 2014) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion to remand their general maritime claim from federal to
state court as removal would deprive the plaintiff of the right to a jury trial saved by the saving to
suitors clause; and rejecting the interpretation of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute to allow
the removal of general maritime claims).
88
See Romero, 358 U.S. at 378–80 (stating general maritime claims are not removable solely on
the basis of admiralty jurisdiction and discussing the importance of the saving to suitors clause).
89
See Ammerman, supra note 55, at 407 (discussing Ryan v. Hercules Offshore Inc., and how the
court in that case interpreted the 2011 amendment to the removal statute); Robertson & Sturley, supra
note 16, at 477 (discussing the 2011 amendment to the removal statute and how courts have interpreted
the amendment).
90
945 F. Supp. 2d 772 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
91
Id. at 773.
87
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92

vessel drilling a deviated relief well. The decedent went into cardiac
arrest and died.93 The plaintiff brought suit in Texas state court, but the
defendants removed the action to federal district court.94 In response, the
plaintiff moved to remand, asserting that traditionally, general maritime
claims have not been removable.95 The defendants’ claimed that, pursuant
to the plain language of the 2011 amendment to the removal statute,
general maritime claims were no longer precluded from removal.96
The court in Ryan began its analysis by recognizing that historically,
general maritime claims were precluded from removal.97 The court asserted
that the bar on removal of general maritime claims was not due to the
saving to suitors clause because that clause only saved to a plaintiff the
right to pursue non-admiralty remedies and did not guarantee a non-federal
forum, nor prevent the removal by a defendant on a basis of federal
jurisdiction other than admiralty.98 Perhaps most significantly, the court
asserted that the true preclusion of general maritime claims from removal
was the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b),99 and that with the recent
amendment to the removal statute, the language that had previously barred
the removal of general maritime claims was deleted.100 The language that
the court referenced was the second sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b),
which stated that “[a]ny other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”101 This language was
not included in the 2011 JVCA amendment to the removal statute.102 The
court reasoned that the language of the removal statute prior to the 2011
JVCA amendment was an Act of Congress precluding removal under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a),103 and that because this language was no longer included
in the removal statute, there was no longer an “Act of Congress” that
precluded the removal of general maritime claims.104 This reasoning was
based on a decision of the Fifth Circuit from the early 1990s, In re
Dutile.105
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 774.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 775.
102
Id. at 777.
103
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
104
Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78.
105
See In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that general maritime claims are
precluded from removal unless there is complete diversity among the parties involved as general
93
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In In re Dutile, the Fifth Circuit held that the preclusion of removal of
general maritime claims was due to the language of the removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a), unless there was complete diversity of the parties
involved.106 This was because maritime actions, whether in personam or in
rem, do not arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
States.107 Therefore, maritime actions fell into the “any other” category of
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), making them non-removable unless there was
diversity among the parties.108 Thus, the court noted that 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) was an Act of Congress that prevented the removal of
maritime actions unless there was an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction, such as diversity jurisdiction.109 This analysis is critical to the
court’s reasoning in Ryan, which relied on the fact that the language in 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) was changed, removing the “any other” language that
previously precluded removal of general maritime claims.110 Thus, the
court in Ryan held that there was no longer an Act of Congress that
precluded the removal of general maritime claims, and therefore, that
general maritime claims were now removable.111 The holding by the court
in Ryan has been cited by several other courts allowing the removal of
general maritime claims.112
For example, in Wells v. Abe’s Boat Rental Inc.,113 the court granted in
part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to remand.114 The court
granted the motion to remand in regard to the plaintiff’s Jones Act claims,
but denied the motion to remand in regard to the plaintiff’s negligence
claim under general maritime law.115 Citing the reasoning of the Ryan
court, the Wells court held that general maritime claims are removable,116
stating that “[e]ven assuming that general maritime law applies, under
Ryan and the cases it cites this action is nonetheless removable, again with
maritime claims fall into the “any other” category of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)); see also Ryan, 945 F. Supp.
2d at 775–76 (discussing the court’s reasoning in In re Dutile).
106
In re Dutile, 935 F.2d at 63.
107
Id. at 62–63; see Romero v. Int’l. Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 367 (1959) (holding
that general maritime claims do not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States).
108
In re Dutile, 935 F.2d at 63.
109
Id.
110
Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78.
111
Id.
112
See Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, slip op. at 6–7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31,
2014) (applying the reasoning of the Ryan court to allow for the removal of general maritime claims);
Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 4–5 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013) (citing Ryan
and Wells v. Abe’s Boat Rentals Inc. as persuasive authority in allowing for the removal of general
maritime claims); Wells v. Abe’s Boat Rentals Inc., No. H-13-112, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. June 18,
2013) (agreeing with and applying the reasoning of Ryan).
113
Wells, No. H-13-112, slip op. at 1.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 2–3.
116
Id. at 3–5.

2015]

STEERING A SAFE COURSE IN ADMIRALTY REMOVAL JURISDICTION

1169

the proviso that the Jones Act claim . . . is severed and remanded to the
state court.”117 Thus, the court in Wells endorsed and relied upon the
reasoning of the court in Ryan.
Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador118 also cited the reasoning of Ryan
in its decision to allow the removal of general maritime claims.119 In
Carrigan, the plaintiff alleged claims under the Jones Act, as well as
claims under general maritime law, including negligence and
unseaworthiness.120 The court held that the plaintiff’s Jones Act claims
were fraudulently pled, and therefore did not bar removal.121 Further, the
court held “for the reasons well explained in Ryan, Plaintiff’s maritime
claims are removable, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is denied.”122
Thus, the court in Carrigan relied upon the reasoning applied by the court
in Ryan to allow for the removal of general maritime claims.
In Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co.,123 the court cited the reasoning in Ryan
and Wells as persuasive authority in its holding that general maritime
claims are removable.124 The plaintiff in Bridges asserted claims under
Louisiana state law, general maritime law, and the Jones Act.125 The court
acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit had historically not allowed the
removal of general maritime claims saved to suitors, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b).126 However, the court, citing Ryan and Wells, noted that the
2011 JVCA amendment deleted the language of the removal statute which
had previously been interpreted as an Act of Congress preventing removal
of general maritime claims, and with the deletion of this language, removal
was no longer precluded.127 Therefore, the court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to remand.128
The above-mentioned cases illustrate how the reasoning developed by
the Ryan court has been applied to allow for the removal of general
maritime claims. The reasoning of the court in Ryan can be summarized as
follows:
117

Id. at 6.
Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2014).
119
Id. at 6.
120
Id. at 2.
121
Id. at 6.
122
Id.
123
Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 1 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013).
124
Id. at 4–5.
125
Id. at 1.
126
Id. at 2.
127
Id. at 4; see Provost v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89, slip op. at 3–4 (M.D. La. June
4, 2014) (applying the same reasoning as in Bridges and finding unpersuasive the argument that the
saving to suitors clause prevents removal, as the plaintiff did not seek a jury trial that could not be
pursued in a federal court sitting in admiralty); see also Garza v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-742, slip op. at
4–5 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2014) (applying the reasoning of the Ryan and Wells courts to deny the
plaintiff’s motion to remand).
128
Bridges, No. 13-477, slip op. at 5.
118
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(1) [F]ederal courts have original jurisdiction over admiralty
claims; (2) the saving to suitors clause does not preclude
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over admiralty
claims originally brought in state court; (3) the old version of
section 1441(b) was relied upon as the “Act of Congress”
that precluded federal courts from exercising removal
jurisdiction unless the requirements of section 1441(b) were
met; and (4) admiralty cases do not arise under the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, so
admiralty cases were considered “any other such actions”
under the prior version of section 1441(b) and were thus
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants was a citizen of the State in
which the action was brought.129
Ryan represents one interpretation of the JVCA, and is arguably the
minority view of how to interpret the recent amendment.130 One aspect that
is not discussed in depth in the aforementioned cases is the effect that the
Ryan interpretation of the JVCA has on the saving to suitors clause. In
contrast to Ryan, other courts have held that the recent JVCA amendment
has had no effect on the ability to remove general maritime claims to
federal court.131
B. The JVCA Should be Interpreted as Having No Effect on the Ability of
General Maritime Claims to be Removed to Federal Court
The JVCA should not be interpreted to allow the removal of general
maritime claims, as such an interpretation would eviscerate the saving to
suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.132 The other main interpretation of the
JVCA holds that the JVCA amendment has no substantial effect on the
removability of general maritime claims. Thus, courts should follow the
precedent of decisions such as Gregoire v. Enterprise Marine Services,
LLC,133 which have interpreted the JVCA as not affecting jurisprudence to
allow for the removal of general maritime claims.134
129

Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
Id.; see Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. Nov.
7, 2014) (“The Court believes that the correct view is also the majority view and that general maritime
claims are not removable, despite the changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.”).
131
Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78; but see Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp.
3d 749, 754 (E.D. La. 2014) (holding that Ryan is an erroneous interpretation of the JVCA and that the
JVCA has no substantial effect on the removability of general maritime claims); Cassidy v. Murray, 34
F. Supp. 3d 579, 583 (D. Md. 2014) (rejecting the reasoning in Ryan); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F.
Supp. 3d 1175, 1179–80 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (rejecting the reasoning in Ryan).
132
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
133
38 F. Supp. 3d 749 (E.D. La. 2014).
134
Id. at 754.
130
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In Gregoire, the court rejected the interpretation of the JVCA of the
court in Ryan v. Hercules and held that the JVCA did not allow for the
removal of general maritime claims.135 The plaintiff in Gregoire invoked
the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333, alleging a Jones Act claim
and general maritime claims in Louisiana state court for injuries sustained
while working for the defendant.136 The defendant timely removed from
state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.137 The plaintiff filed a motion to
remand asserting that general maritime claims are not removable, without
an independent basis because they are not within the original jurisdiction
of the federal court when brought pursuant to the saving to suitors clause
of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.138 The defendant, in opposition to the motion,
asserted that due to the 2011 JVCA amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) no
longer precluded the removal of general maritime claims, and that general
maritime claims were now normally removable.139
The court stated that “[t]he issue in this case hinges upon the operation
of the ‘saving to suitors clause,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1333, with respect to removal
of maritime and admiralty claims under the removal statute.”140 The court
explicitly declined to follow the interpretation of the JVCA by the court in
Ryan v. Hercules;141 instead, the court in Gregoire concluded that “‘the
statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and more than
200 years of precedent interpreting this grant’ rather than the 2011
amendment to the removal statute . . . determine the removability of
Gregoire’s claims.”142 Thus, the court noted that general maritime claims
have historically never been removable and are not currently removable,
unless there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction aside from 28
U.S.C. § 1333.143
The court based its reasoning on the history of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and
how § 1333 provides exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts of in rem
actions, but provides concurrent jurisdiction to state courts of in personam
actions.144 This superficially appears to place maritime actions within the
original jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), thus allowing the removal of
such claims.145 However, the Gregoire court stated that Congress had
carefully written 28 U.S.C. § 1333 to balance the interests of federalism,
135

Id.; Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78.
Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 752.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 753.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 754.
142
Id. (quoting Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014)).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 764.
145
Id.
136
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and that the inclusion of the saving to suitors clause was in recognition of
the historical development of maritime actions in state courts.146 The court
noted that “[m]aritime claims initiated in state court are, by definition,
brought at common law under the saving to suitors clause as an ‘exception’
to the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.”147 Thus, the change in
language of the 2011 JVCA amendment “in no way modified the longstanding rule that general maritime law claims require some other nonadmiralty source of jurisdiction to be removable.”148
The court in Coronel v. AK Victory149 also rejected the interpretation of
the JVCA amendment allowing removal of general maritime claims.150 The
plaintiff in Coronel asserted claims of maintenance, cure, and lost wages
under the general maritime law, as well as a Jones Act claim in
Washington state court.151 The defendant removed the claim to federal
district court, and the plaintiff filed a motion to remand.152 The parties in
the action focused their arguments on the language of the removal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1441, but the court focused its analysis on the “statutory grant
of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and the more than 200 years of
precedent interpreting this grant to determine the removability of
the . . . claims.”153
The court began by analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which provides
exclusive jurisdiction of in rem admiralty actions to federal courts, and the
saving to suitors clause, which preserves the concurrent jurisdiction of
state courts over in personam admiralty actions.154 The court, citing to a
Ninth Circuit decision, noted that the saving to suitors clause provides
litigants with three options for a plaintiff alleging admiralty claims. “‘He
may file suit in federal court under the federal court’s admiralty
jurisdiction, in federal court under diversity jurisdiction if the parties are
diverse and the amount in controversy is satisfied, or in state court.’”155
The court described how historically, saving to suitors clause claims could
not be removed from state court absent another basis for federal
jurisdiction, such as diversity jurisdiction or another maritime statute such
as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.156 Another basis for jurisdiction
146

Id.
Id.
148
Id.
149
1 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
150
Id. at 1180.
151
Id. at 1177.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 1178.
154
Id. at 1181.
155
Id. at 1186 (quoting Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 115 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (9th Cir.
1997)).
156
Id.; see 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with (A) any operation
147
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is necessary, as 28 U.S.C. § 1333 does not provide subject matter
jurisdiction to federal courts for maritime claims brought at law without an
independent basis, and allowing removal of general maritime claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) without an independent jurisdictional basis
would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause.157 Thus, the court held that
general maritime claims were not removable without an independent basis,
due to federalism concerns and the balance of power between federal and
state courts, in addition to the saving to suitors clause, and the established
precedent of not allowing the removal of general maritime claims without
an independent basis.158
In Cassidy v. Murray,159 the court rejected the Ryan v. Hercules court’s
interpretation of the 2011 JVCA amendment.160 In Cassidy, the plaintiffs
alleged claims of negligence against the defendant, and initially brought
suit in Maryland state court.161 The defendant removed the action, and the
plaintiffs filed a motion to remand.162 The court in Cassidy focused its
reasoning on the saving to suitors clause, and the effect the Ryan
interpretation would have on 28 U.S.C. § 1333.163 In rejecting the Ryan
interpretation of the JVCA, the court stated:
First, the removal of admiralty cases without an independent
jurisdictional basis permits the very occurrence the Supreme
Court attempted to avoid in Romero—the evisceration of the
savings clause. The purpose of the clause is to preserve the
traditional role of the states in the administration of the
common-law remedies for maritime cases. Permitting
defendants to remove these cases without an independent
jurisdictional basis not only disrupts decades of maritime
precedent but also renders the saving clause null and void.164
Further, the court noted that the saving to suitors clause illustrates the
importance of preserving the plaintiff’s choice of which forum to bring his
cause of action.165 The court was not willing to reject decades of
jurisprudence to adopt an attempt to change removal procedures without
conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, ….”); Barker v.
Hercules Offshore Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 220 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act and original federal jurisdiction).
157
Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1184–85.
158
Id. at 1187–88.
159
34 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. Md. 2014).
160
Id. at 581; see Ryan v. Hercules Offshore Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
(holding that general maritime claims are now removable under the JVCA).
161
Cassidy, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 580.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 581.
164
Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
165
Id. at 584.
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166

clear precedential authority. Thus, Cassidy v. Murray demonstrates a
rejection of the Ryan court’s interpretation of the JVCA with special
emphasis placed on the adverse consequences to the saving to suitors
clause.
In Harrold v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters,167 a United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana decision, the plaintiff’s
right to a jury trial was a consideration in the court’s rejection of the Ryan
interpretation of the JVCA.168 The plaintiff in Harrold asserted general
maritime claims for negligence and a Jones Act claim.169 These claims
were brought in state court with a request for a jury trial.170 The defendant
removed the action and the plaintiff sought to have the action remanded to
state court.171 The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand for three
reasons.172 The first reason was that the plaintiff had specifically requested
a trial by jury, and allowing the defendant to remove the action would
deprive the plaintiff of a jury trial.173 The court noted how the saving to
suitors clause prevents such outcomes, and ordered that the action must be
remanded.174 The court’s second rationale was in regard to the Jones Act
claim, but the third reason for granting the plaintiff’s motion to remand
was a rejection of the Ryan court’s interpretation of the JVCA.175 The court
stated that “the correct view is also the majority view and that general
maritime claims are not removable, despite the changes to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441.”176
In Yavorsky v. Felice Navigation, Inc.,177 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana rejected the reasoning of the
Ryan interpretation of the 2011 JVCA amendment, and applied the
reasoning that the court in Gregoire established.178 Thus, the court held
that the 2011 amendment to the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, did not
change the precedent that general maritime claims initially brought in state
court are not removable absent an independent basis for jurisdiction in
federal court.179
The aforementioned cases illustrate the correct interpretation of the
166

Id.
Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 1 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014).
168
Id. at 2.
169
Id. at 1.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 2.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 2–3.
176
Id. at 3.
177
Yavorsky v. Felice Navigation, Inc., No. 14-2007, slip op. at 1 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014).
178
Id. at 4–5.
179
Id. at 5.
167
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2011 JVCA amendment. In addition to the cases detailed, a multitude of
other courts have also interpreted the JVCA amendment as not changing
the removability of general maritime claims.180 Courts should continue to
interpret the JVCA amendment as not changing the removal jurisdiction of
general maritime claims to federal courts.
V. THE 2011 JVCA AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT BE
INTERPRETED AS HAVING AN EFFECT ON THE
REMOVABILITY OF GENERAL MARITIME CLAIMS
Courts should not interpret the JVCA amendment to allow for the
removal of general maritime claims, contrary to the reasoning in Ryan v.
Hercules,181 as doing so would eviscerate the saving to suitors clause.
Instead, courts should follow the precedent of cases such as Gregoire v.
Enterprise Marine Services, LLC, and Coronel v. AK Victory in
interpreting the JVCA amendment to have no material effect on the
removability of general maritime claims.182 Interpreting the JVCA
amendment in a manner similar to Gregoire and Coronel recognizes the
importance of the saving to suitors clause, and preserves the jurisdictional
balance between federal and state courts, which the saving to suitors clause
seeks to protect. Following the interpretation of the JVCA amendment, as
interpreted by the courts in Gregoire and Coronel, would also be consistent
with the seminal decision of Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., and the concerns the Court in Romero had with protecting the saving
to suitors clause from being undermined.183 Thus, courts should interpret
the 2011 JVCA amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 as having no significant
effect on the ability of general maritime claims to be removed to federal
court.
Courts have noted that there is a precedential history of more than twohundred years that does not allow for the removal of general maritime

180
See Bartman v. Burrece, No. 3:14-CV-0080-RRB, 2014 WL 4096226, at *3 (D. Alaska Aug.
18, 2014) (“Notwithstanding recent amendments to the statute governing removal, the reservation of
remedies at common law preserved in the statute granting the Court’s original jurisdiction support
remand of this matter back to state court.”); Figueroa v. Marine Inspection Servs., LLC, 28 F. Supp. 3d
677, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“This Court disagrees with the holding in Ryan.”); Gabriles v. Chevron
USA, Inc., No. 2:14-00669, slip op. at 4 (W.D. La. June 6, 2014) (“The Court disagrees that the 2011
amendment altered the long-held understanding that admiralty claims brought at law in state court
pursuant to the saving to suitors clause are not removable in the absence of an independent
jurisdictional basis.” (footnote omitted)).
181
Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
182
Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754 (E.D. La. 2014); Coronel v.
AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
183
See Romero v. Int’l. Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371–72 (1959) (discussing the
importance of the saving to suitors clause and how the choice of a maritime plaintiff to bring suit in
either state or federal court needs to be protected).
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claims without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Therefore,
the Ryan interpretation of the 2011 JVCA amendment reverses over twohundred years of precedent by allowing the removal of general maritime
claims without an independent basis.185 The Ryan decision is a drastic
departure from established precedent and has caused confusion among
courts in how to interpret the JVCA amendment.186 Such a dramatic
departure from precedent should not be undertaken on the basis of the
deletion of one sentence from the federal removal statute, which is
essentially the rationale behind the court’s decision in Ryan.187 The
rationale used by the court in Ryan also fails to place sufficient weight
upon the saving to suitors clause, and the effect that interpreting the JVCA
amendment to allow removal of general maritime claims would have upon
the saving to suitors clause and plaintiffs seeking to bring their causes of
action in state court.188
The Ryan interpretation of the JVCA amendment would essentially
abrogate the saving to suitors clause by allowing a defendant to freely
remove general maritime claims brought by a plaintiff in state court
seeking common law remedies. The saving to suitors clause is an important
qualifier to the grant of original jurisdiction to the lower federal courts
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333189 and acts as an exception to the original
jurisdiction of federal courts over admiralty actions.190 Thus, significantly,
the saving to suitors clause preserves the concurrent jurisdiction of state

184
See Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (quoting Coronel in regard to the history of the removal of
general maritime claims); Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1178 (discussing the precedential history of
removal jurisdiction); see also Romero, 358 U.S. 354 at 363 n.16 (“The removal provisions of the
original Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, conferred a limited removal jurisdiction, not including cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In none of the statutes enacted since that time have savingclause cases been made removable.”).
185
See Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78 (discussing deletions to the statute that required cases to
meet certain requirements for removal and the substantive congressional intent of those changes).
186
See, e.g., Cassidy v. Murray, 34 F. Supp. 3d 579, 583 (D. Md. 2014) (rejecting the reasoning in
Ryan); Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 4–5 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013)
(citing Ryan as persuasive authority for allowing the removal of general maritime claims).
187
See Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78 (holding that there is no longer an Act of Congress that
precludes the removal of general maritime claims due to the JVCA amendment deleting language in 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b)).
188
Id. (discussing the saving to suitors clause, but not the effect that allowing the removal of
general maritime claims would have upon the saving to suitors clause).
189
See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012) (providing the jurisdictional basis for federal admiralty
jurisdiction including the saving to suitors clause).
190
See Barker v. Hercules Offshore Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A]dmiralty
jurisdiction is not present in this suit because Barker filed in state court, therefore invoking the savingto-suitors exception to original jurisdiction.”); Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d
749, 764 (E.D. La. 2014) (discussing the saving to suitors clause and how it operates as an exception to
the original jurisdiction of federal courts when a claim is brought in state court).
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courts over certain admiralty actions, as exclusive original jurisdiction of
the federal courts is limited to in rem actions, while in personam actions,
pursuant to the saving to suitors clause, may be brought in either state or
federal court.192 The interpretation of the JVCA by the court in Ryan
destroys these federalism ideals that the saving to suitors clause is intended
to protect.193
The court’s interpretation of the JVCA in Ryan annihilates the
federalism principles that the saving to suitors clause intends to protect by
allowing the removal of general maritime claims. This interpretation
destroys the ability of a plaintiff to bring a general maritime action in state
court because, once the action is initially filed in state court, the defendant
could simply remove the action and the plaintiff would be forced to litigate
in federal court, which functionally shifts the selection of the forum to the
defendant. Thus, the concurrent jurisdiction preserved by the saving to
suitors clause is eliminated and the federal court would, in practice, have
exclusive original jurisdiction of not only in rem actions, but in personam
actions as well. Providing federal courts with exclusive original
jurisdiction over both in rem and in personam proceedings would be a
significant break with established precedent that should not be considered
lightly and is contrary to the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction in 28
U.S.C. § 1333.194
Interpreting the JVCA amendment to allow for the removal of general
maritime claims brought in state court would also have important
ramifications for the remedies that a plaintiff would be able to seek. The
saving to suitors clause saves to a plaintiff common law remedies—most
notably the ability to request a trial by jury.195 When a suit is brought in
admiralty, a jury trial is generally not an available remedy, as the Seventh

191
See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372 (1959) (“By making maritime
cases removable to the federal courts it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally
exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters—a jurisdiction which it was
the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to preserve.”).
192
Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560–61 (1954) (discussing the difference between
in rem and in personam jurisdiction and over which proceedings federal courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction).
193
See Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (allowing
for the removal of general maritime claims, which the saving to suitors clause intends to prevent by
providing state courts concurrent jurisdiction).
194
See Romero, 358 U.S. at 372 (discussing the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts
that the saving to suitors clause preserves); Madruga, 346 U.S. at 560–61 (stating that federal courts
only have exclusive original jurisdiction of in rem proceedings).
195
Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Perhaps the most
salient distinction persisting between maritime claims brought in admiralty and at law is the right to a
jury trial.”); see also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“While this Court has held
that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither the Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution forbids them.”).
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Amendment does not include admiralty actions. Accordingly, when a
plaintiff seeks a trial by jury, the saving to suitors clause allows the
plaintiff the option of pursuing his claim in state court. If the JVCA
amendment were to be interpreted to freely allow the removal of general
maritime claims, the ability of a plaintiff to seek a trial by jury would be
severely impeded. This interpretation would allow a defendant to remove a
plaintiff’s action from state court, where the plaintiff could seek a trial by
jury, to federal court, where the plaintiff would lose his right to seek a jury
trial. This possibility is illustrated in the case of Harrold v. Liberty
Insurance Underwriters Inc., in which the plaintiff sought a jury trial
pursuant to the saving to suitors clause in state court and the defendant
removed the action to federal court.197 The court noted that the plaintiff
would be denied his request to seek a trial by jury if the action was allowed
to proceed in federal court, and that the saving to suitors clause prohibited
such an outcome.198 Harrold acts as a stark warning of the potential
negative consequences that an interpretation of the JVCA allowing the
removal of general maritime claims may have in depriving a plaintiff of the
ability to seek a jury trial.
Further, a court that had previously agreed with the Ryan interpretation
of the JVCA has called into question Ryan’s reasoning when applied to
parties seeking jury trials.199 In Perise v. Eni Petroleum, U.S. L.L.C.,200 the
court held that federal question jurisdiction was proper pursuant to a
statutory basis aside from 28 U.S.C. § 1333.201 However, the court
discussed the recent JVCA amendment and its effect on removal of general
maritime claims.202 The magistrate judge noted that the district judge in the
case agreed with the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA allowing for the
removal of general maritime claims but had not considered the implication
of the saving to suitors clause in barring the removal of general maritime
claims.203 The court stated “[i]f [the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act]
was not a basis for this court’s jurisdiction, then Plaintiff’s maritime claims
may warrant remand under the ‘savings to suitors’ clause because of his
jury demand.”204 This is noteworthy as it appears to be a retreat by a court
that had previously held the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA to be correct
196

Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1183.
Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, No. 13-762, slip op. at 1–2 (M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014).
198
Id. at 2.
199
See Perise v. Eni Petroleum, U.S. L.L.C., No. 14-99-SDD-RLB, slip op. at 5 (M.D. La. Oct. 1,
2014) (stating that even though a district judge had previously agreed with the Ryan interpretation of
the JVCA, this interpretation may be incorrect when a plaintiff requests a jury trial).
200
Id. at 1.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 5.
203
Id.
204
Id.
197
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and calls into question the viability of the removal of general maritime
claims when a jury trial is sought by the plaintiff.205 The court explicitly
stated that it had not previously considered the consequence of the saving
to suitors clause when agreeing with the Ryan interpretation of the
JVCA.206 Thus, when considering the damaging effect that the Ryan
interpretation of the JVCA could have by denying a plaintiff the ability to
seek a jury trial, under the saving to suitors clause, courts should reject the
Ryan interpretation, and heed the concerns raised by the court in Perise.207
The court in Ryan v. Hercules relied extensively on the removal of key
language in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), holding that this language was an Act of
Congress that prohibited removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and
with the JVCA’s change in language in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), there was no
longer an Act of Congress barring removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).208
However, this reasoning is flawed, as there is still an Act of Congress that
bars the removal of general maritime claims.209 That Act of Congress is 28
U.S.C. § 1333, which includes the saving to suitors clause, allowing a
plaintiff the ability to bring his claims in state court, and barring the
removal of such claims unless there is an independent basis for removal.210
Pursuant to the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly provided by [an] Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .”211 The JVCA changed
the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, but the saving to suitors clause of 28
U.S.C. § 1333 has not been changed, and is still an Act of Congress which
allows a plaintiff to bring general maritime claims in state court, unless
there is an independent basis for removal.212 Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 is an
Act of Congress that bars removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Applying the reasoning of the Ryan court, the saving to suitors clause is an
205

Id.
Id.
207
Id.; see Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
(holding that general maritime claims are removable under the JVCA amendment).
208
Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777; see In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
general maritime claims are not removable due to the language of the federal removal statute).
209
See Robertson & Sturley, supra note 16, at 408 (“[I]t is black-letter law that the saving to
suitors clause is an ‘express[]’ provision of Congress against the removability of state-court maritime
cases.” (internal citations omitted)); but see Ammerman, supra note 55, at 414 (“It is likely that federal
appellate courts and perhaps eventually the Supreme Court will take up the issue of whether general
maritime law claims are removable as the plain language of § 1441(a) now indicates—despite the
saving-to-suitors exception . . . .” (emphasis added)).
210
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
211
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).
212
28 U.S.C. § 1333; Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
(“[T]hroughout the history of federal admiralty jurisdiction—from the Judiciary Act of 1789 through
Romero and up to the present—courts have given no indication that maritime claims are cognizable on
the law side of the federal courts absent subject matter jurisdiction independent of 28 U.S.C. § 1333.”).
206
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Act of Congress that should prevent the removal of general maritime
claims.213
It is interesting to note the location of the courts that agree with the
Ryan interpretation of the JVCA as compared to the location of courts that
reject the Ryan interpretation. District courts in the Fifth Circuit are
currently split as to which interpretation of the JVCA is correct.214 The
Southern District of Texas continues to apply the reasoning of Ryan.215
Another state in the Fifth Circuit, Louisiana, is split as to whether the Ryan
interpretation of the JVCA is correct.216 In Gregoire, the Eastern District of
Louisiana held that the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA was erroneous and
that the JVCA did not have a substantial effect on the removability of
general maritime claims.217 However, the Western and Middle Districts of
Louisiana are split as to whether the Ryan or the Gregoire interpretation of
the JVCA is correct.218
The rejection of the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA amendment is not
limited to courts in the Fifth Circuit. District courts in two other circuits,
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, have also rejected the Ryan interpretation of
the JVCA.219 In Cassidy v. Murray,220 the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland explicitly rejected the Ryan interpretation of the
JVCA.221 Additionally, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington has rejected the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA
amendment.222 These cases demonstrate that Ryan represents the minority
213
28 U.S.C. § 1333; 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012); see Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777 (stating that as
there is no longer an Act of Congress precluding removal of general maritime claims, thus general
maritime claims are now removable).
214
See Ryan, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78 (holding that general maritime claims are now removable
under the JVCA). But see Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754 (E.D. La.
2014) (holding that the JVCA did not change the removability of general maritime claims).
215
See Carrigan v. M/V AMC Ambassador, No. H-13-03208, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31,
2014) (citing the reasoning in Ryan to allow for the removal of general maritime claims); Ryan, 945 F.
Supp. 2d at 777–78 (allowing for the removability of general maritime claims); Wells v. Abe’s Boat
Rentals Inc., No. H-13-1112, slip op. at 3–4 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2013) (agreeing with and applying
Ryan’s reasoning).
216
See Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (stating that the JVCA did not change the removability of
general maritime claims). But see Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, slip op. at 4 (M.D.
La. Nov. 19, 2013) (citing Ryan and Wells as persuasive authority in allowing for the removal of
general maritime claims).
217
Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754.
218
See Provost v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89-SDD-SCR, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. June
4, 2014) (allowing for the removal of general maritime claims under the JVCA amendment to the
removal statute); but see Gabriles v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 2:14-00669, slip op. at 4 (W.D. La. June
6, 2014) (disagreeing that the JVCA amendment allows for the removal of general maritime claims).
219
Cassidy v. Murray, 34 F. Supp. 3d 579, 583 (D. Md. 2014); Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp.
3d 1175, 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
220
Cassidy, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 580.
221
Id. at 583.
222
Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1180.
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view of the JVCA interpretation and should not be adopted in other
circuits.223
In addition, the Ryan interpretation of the JVCA does not follow the
principles established for determining when removal is appropriate.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the federal removal
statute is to be strictly construed against removal.224 Further, federal
jurisdiction “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of
removal in the first instance.”225 Removal is to be strictly construed due in
part to federalism concerns because the removing court deprives a state
court from properly hearing an action.226 The court in Ryan did not follow
these principles because it did not apply the well established precedent that
the removal of general maritime claims is not allowed without an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.227 In Ryan, the court did not
reject the removal of the action even though there was a doubt that removal
was improper. In its interpretation of the JVCA, the Ryan court did not
strictly construe the removal statute, but interpreted the statute in a manner
that enlarged federal removal jurisdiction on an unprecedented scale.
Therefore, as the Ryan court interpreted the JVCA in a manner that is
inconsistent with established removal principles, the interpretation is
erroneous.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent amendment to the federal removal statute has caused
uncertainty in regard to the removability of general maritime claims
without an independent jurisdictional basis aside from 28 U.S.C. § 1333.228
However, when one considers the more than two-hundred years of
precedent prohibiting the removal of general maritime claims without an
independent basis for jurisdiction and the effect an interpretation allowing
removal would have on the saving to suitors clause, it becomes readily
apparent that there is only one correct interpretation of the JVCA
amendment. The correct interpretation is that there has been no substantial
change in the removability of general maritime claims and that a general
223
See Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Nos. 13-762, 13-831, slip op. at 3 (M.D. La. Nov. 7,
2014) (stating that the Ryan interpretation is the minority view for interpreting the JVCA).
224
See Coronel, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 1178 (discussing the principles that courts apply to determine
whether removal is appropriate).
225
Id. (citations omitted).
226
See Gregoire v. Enter. Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 753 (E.D. La. 2014)
(“Additionally, because removal jurisdiction implicates important federalism concerns, the federal
removal statute is subject to strict construction.”).
227
Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777–78 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (allowing for
the removal of general maritime claims).
228
Id. But see Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (holding that general maritime claims are not
removable and that the JVCA did not substantially change removal jurisdiction).
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maritime claim can be removed only when there is an independent basis
for federal jurisdiction.229 This interpretation is consistent with precedent
and also protects the saving to suitors clause from being eviscerated. Thus,
as courts continue to chart their way through removal jurisdiction, they
should interpret the JVCA as having no substantial effect on the
removability of general maritime claims.230

229
See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372–75 (1959) (discussing how
general maritime claims cannot be removed without an independent basis aside from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333); Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (requiring an independent basis for the removal of general
maritime claims).
230
Gregoire, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 754 (“In short, general maritime law claims are not now
removable—nor have they ever been—without an independent basis of jurisdiction other than 28
U.S.C. § 1333 . . . .”).

